Abstract. This paper addresses four fundamental questions about the relationship between "smart growth," a fiscally motivated anti-sprawl policy movement, and public finance: Do low-density, spatially extensive land use patterns cost more to support? If so, how large of an influence does sprawl actually have? How does the influence differ among types of spending? And, how does it compare to the influence of other relevant factors? The analysis, which is based on the entire continental United States and uses a series of spatial econometric models to evaluate one aggregate (total direct) and nine disaggregate (education, fire protection, housing and community development, libraries, parks and recreation, police protection, roadways, sewerage, and solid waste disposal) measures of spending, provides the most detailed evidence to date of how sprawl affects the vast sum of revenue that local governments spend every year.
Introduction
During the 2002 fiscal year, the 87,576 local governments in the United States-counting all counties, boroughs, municipalities, townships, school districts, and special districts-channeled over $1.14 trillion toward the provision of public services. Of this amount, 38.72% ($441.43 billion) was spent on education services, 11.15% ($127.07 billion) was spent on social services and income maintenance, 9.22% ($105.15 billion) was spent on environmental services and housing, 9.05% ($103.21 billion) was spent on public safety, 5.64% ($64.32 billion) was spent on transportation services, 4.66% ($53.11 billion) was spent on administrative services, and 3.85% ($43.88 billion) was spent paying interest on debt; the remaining 17.71% ($201.92 billion) was spent on utilities, insurance trusts, and other miscellaneous activities and operating costs (Census of Governments 2005) . As shown in Table 1 , which lists 2002 population, gross state product, and expenditure patterns by state, across all categories, local governments spent a combined national average of $3,959 per capita, a value that, in total, represents 10.95% of the gross domestic product.
Although many factors influence the allocation, distribution, and volume of this spending, there is a growing conviction among urban and regional policymakers that the character of the built environment is one of them. Specifically, the kind of low-density, spatially extensive pattern of growth commonly characterized as "sprawl" (Bruegmann 2005 ) is thought to raise the cost of public services because it fails to capitalize on economies of scale and/or optimize on facility location. On the other hand, more compact modes of development are believed to reduce costs by concentrating residents together and creating locational efficiencies in access and delivery. The thinking is that, because public finance ultimately plays out across geographic space, the dimensions of the development it supports matter in substantive ways.
Based on this reasoning, advocates of "smart growth," a movement that seeks a holistic rethinking of the contemporary approach to land use planning, have advanced policy frameworks that, among other things, specifically emphasize the importance of fiscal health (DeGrove 2005) .
For example, the State of Maryland's (1998) Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation Act establishes "priority funding areas," or specific districts where development is supported via public investment in capital facilities and other needs. Similarly, more established state land use planning mandates in Florida, Oregon, Washington, and elsewhere promote contiguity of growth and concurrency, which requires capacity in necessary infrastructure and services to be in place before development can proceed (see Knaap et al. 2001) . What makes the present push for smart growth so striking is that it and its fiscally motivated anti-sprawl policies have been enjoined by states as diverse as Arizona, Maine, Michigan, and Tennessee (Gray 2005) . The movement has also gathered broad-based support at the local level, and, perhaps for that reason, it has produced remarkably consistent land use patterns in communities across the country (Song 2005) . In short, on the promise of limiting sprawl and its financial discontents, smart growth has rapidly swept the United States and brought about far-reaching changes in the way that state and local governments plan for development.
But, beyond this political and on-the-ground progress loom difficult questions about the veracity of connections between the built environment and the cost of public services. In particular, there is little empirical evidence that sprawl is more expensive to support and, in fact, research on the issue has produced conflicting results. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the relationship, if any, applies to all types of expenditures in the same way-it may be, for example, that the influence of the built environment cuts in both directions, raising some costs and lowering others depending on the nature of the service in question. Do low-density, spatially extensive land use patterns cost more to support? If so, how large of an influence does sprawl actually have? How does the influence differ among types of spending? And, finally, how does it compare to the influence of other relevant factors? The answers to these questions are key to understanding how well the anti-sprawl policies of smart growth line up with its objective of promoting fiscal health. 
Background Discussion

Measuring and Explaining Sprawl
Sprawl is defined here as the kind of low-density, spatially extensive pattern of development that has become prevalent throughout the United States over the course of the last 50 years (Fulton et al. 2001; Glaeser and Kahn 2004; Bruegmann 2005; Úlfarsson and Carruthers 2006) . The best way-and, at present, virtually the only way-to measure the reach and pace of sprawl nationally is via the USDA's (2001) National Resources Inventory (NRI), which provides estimates of the amount of land in major land use categories at the county level for the years 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 . A limitation of the NRI is that, at high resolution, it is known to have a wide enough margin of error that reported values for, say, the amount of developed land in a given county, may 1 Note here that public finance is only one of several core concerns of smart growth, which, in fact, has a very broad quality-of-life orientation. For example, the Smart Growth Network describes the movement as being motivated by "…a growing concern that current development patterns-dominated by what some call "sprawl"-are no longer in the long-term interest of our cities, existing suburbs, small towns, rural communities, or wilderness areas. Though supportive of growth, communities are questioning the economic costs of abandoning infrastructure in the city, only to rebuild it further out. Spurring the smart growth movement are demographic shifts, a strong environmental ethic, i n c r e a s e d f i s c a l c o n c e r n s , a n d m o r e n u a n c e d v i e w s o f g r o w t h . " S e e : www. smartgrowth.org/about/default.asp?res=1280. be imprecise. As a result, the data is not reliable enough to know with certainty that there are "exactly x number of acres of developed land in county i," so some of its documentation cautions against using it at that level. Because this limitation is sometimes viewed as an issue (Burchfield et al. 2006) , it is important to be clear that the warning is there mainly to comply with data reporting requirements set forth by the Office of Management and Budget, which is responsible for the quality of information collected and disseminated by the federal government.
2 All of that said, the NRI does an excellent job of capturing how development patterns vary cross-sectionally and longitudinally or, in other words, how land use in county i differs from land use in county j and how land use in county i has changed between two or more points in time, t. Used in this way, the data measures land use representatively, even if individual data points are imprecise in some cases.
To demonstrate the validity of using the NRI for cross-sectional analysis, Figures 1 and 2 compare its (1997) measure of developed land area to the Census Bureau's (2000) measure of urbanized land area 3 in all counties located in the continental United States. Specifically, Figure 1 is a scatter plot that registers acres of developed land on the x-axis and acres of urbanized land on the y-axis and Figure 2 is a histogram of the absolute value of the difference between the two as a percentage of total county land area. 4 Both charts reveal a high degree of correspondence between the two estimates of land use: The trend line fit to the scatter plot has an R 2 of 0.91 and the histogram indicates that, in 80% of the sample, the difference is a value that ranges between just one and five percent of total county land area. Together, Figures 1 and 2 indicate that the NRI data provides a good overall representation of how development patterns vary across the country, at least with respect to another commonly used measure of land use.
Since this comparison is admittedly rather coarse, it is reassuring that other researchers have come to similar conclusions about the ability of the NRI to representatively measure land use. For example, a recent comparison by Irwin and Bockstael (2006) finds that the NRI lines up exceptionally well with land cover data derived from multispectral satellite imagery. The analysis 2 The authors have discussed this directly with NRI staff and the reason for the cautionary statement is that the data has statistical properties that require a level of analytical expertise above-and-beyond that of the public at large in order to use and interpret it properly. A statement by OMB on federal data reporting requirements is available online, in the Federal Register: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/2006/092206_stat_surveys.pdf. 3 The Census Bureau categorizes every census block in the country that has an average population density of 1,000 people per square mile, or about 1.5 people per acre, as urban, so summing the area of these blocks by county yields an estimate of the spatial extent of the built-up area within each county. Note that this measure is based on average population density, not actual land use, and some counties register no urbanized land area at all-in these instances, the NRI's measure of developed land area is correspondingly very small. 4 The histogram is of the values resulting from this calculation: |developed land area -urbanized land area| / total county land area. Note that there are nine counties that do not appear on the histogram because these outliers stretch the figure out too far to be easily readable; in these cases, the differences are 21%, 23%, 25% (× 2), 29% (× 2), 36%, 38%, and 93%.
involves data for just the State of Maryland and uses somewhat larger (multi-county) areas than are of interest here, but the two measures are nearly identical and their close relationship apparently holds across the size-of-place hierarchy, because there is little difference among urban, suburban, exurban, and rural groupings of counties. So, although imperfect, the NRI is consistent with alternative data sources and it remains virtually the only one presently available for comparing land use patterns across the country as a whole.
Returning now to the matter at hand, Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the reach and pace of sprawl in the United States during recent years. Figure 3 , which maps changes in aggregate density, measured as the number of people plus jobs per acre of developed land, shows that only about a fifth of all counties (691 out of 3,075) grew more dense between 1982 and 1997.
Meanwhile, Figure 4 , which maps the proportion of land absorption that took place during the last five years of the whole 15-year timeframe, 5 shows that the trend toward sprawl appears to have accelerated: In nearly half of all counties (1,285 out of 3,075) more than 50% of the overall change in developed land occurred between 1992 and 1997. If the trend were more-or-less constant, the pattern shown on the map would not emerge because the 5-year rate of land absorption would instead be closer to 33%.
The nation's land use has evolved in this way mostly because of population growth combined with rising incomes and falling commuting costs-an early cross-sectional analysis of sprawl found that these basic factors explain nearly 80% of variation in the spatial extent of regions' urbanized land area (Brueckner and Fansler 1983) -but other, more nuanced factors also play a role. In particular, three market failures, the failure of development to internalize (1) the benefits of open space, (2) the social costs of traffic congestion, and (3) the cost of the services that it requires, contribute to a sub-optimal pattern of land use (Brueckner 2000) . While each of these is important to understanding sprawl, the third is central to the present analysis because, as a corollary, it suggests that growth would be more dense if it had to pay the full cost of the services needed to support it. In fact, both theoretical (Brueckner 1997; McFarlane 1999) and empirical (Pendall 1999) analyses show that impact fees, which attempt to correct for this problem, promote compact development. So, even though sprawl is largely explained by basic human ecology, it is also fueled by more complicated market failures, at least one of which is linked to public finance.
Either way, if the connections between the built environment and the cost of public services are as substantial as many policymakers judge them to be, the trend documented in Figures 3 and 4 suggests that the consequences of sprawl may indeed be quite large.
Smart Growth as a Policy Response
Acting on public finance oriented (among other) concerns, a number of states have adopted legislation aimed at limiting sprawl (Carruthers 2002 ). This began with what is often described as the "first wave" of state land use legislation that evolved out of the environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s. At the time, the main objective was to create mechanisms for overseeing local decision-making processes, particularly with respect to the conversion of farmland and "developments of regional impact," such as major capital facilities and shopping centers. During the 1980s, the "second wave" of state land use legislation popularized the concept of "growth management," an approach to land use planning that emphasizes the need to accommodate, rather than limit, development through a coordinated effort among local governments. It was during this period that the nationwide conversation first began to shift toward identifying the policy-relevant problems of sprawl and developing specific mechanisms, like concurrency, for addressing them in ways other than restricting growth outright. Finally, the "third wave" of state land use legislation, which emerged in the 1990s, brought "smart growth," with its holistic orientation toward quality of life, to the forefront of urban and regional policy. These frameworks often cast local, rather than state, governments as the agents of land use reform and almost unilaterally cite environmental and/or fiscal motivations for confronting sprawl. The practical appeal of smart growth combined with its on-the-ground success has given it considerable political traction: As of 2005, legislation had been adopted by 20 states 6 and many other initiatives have been implemented independently at the local level (see DeGrove 1984 DeGrove , 1992 DeGrove , 2005 for a complete accounting of the history summarized here).
As opposed to sprawl, the benefits of smart growth for public finance are believed to be at least twofold (Knaap and Nelson 1992) . First, advocates often argue that, for many public services, the cost per unit-that is, per person or household-of output is higher for low-density development because it fails to capitalize on economies of scale, which are achieved by concentrating users together. Second, spatially extensive development, whatever the density, is accused of making it difficult to optimize on facility location, especially if it happens in a noncontiguous way. Simply put, the reasoning is that sprawl is inefficient because, other things being equal, the cost of public services is negatively influenced by density and positively influenced by the spatial extent of developed land. The rejoinder for years has been that the "harshness" of high-density, compact built environments acts as a countervailing force that, after a point, overrides any financial efficiency they may achieve (Ladd 1998) . Central cities, for example, often require large amounts of public investment for things like police protection and roadway maintenance due to their social complexity and economic primacy, which affect how intensively services are used. The reasoning here is that, like other commodities, public services are subject to both economies and diseconomies of scale, with the latter being a consequence of the kind of congestion, disorder, social pathologies, and other problems found in many densely populated areas. However, it is too rarely pointed out that the connection to the built environment in-and-of-itself may not be as strong as it has been made out to be-a paper by Gordon and Richardson (1997) is a good example-because the perspective seems, at times, to conflate the influence of land use with problems that have more to do with the deterioration and strife experienced by many aged, builtup areas of the country. From this line of reasoning, it follows that high-density, compact development patterns may well be less expensive to support and that the "harshness" of these environments is a different issue that must be dealt with separately.
The few empirical analyses of the relationship between the built environment and the cost of public services have, over time, produced results that are consistent with both of the perspectives just described. Research on the first dimension of sprawl, the density of developed land, essentially began with the Real Estate Research Corporation's (RERC 1974) muchmaligned Costs of Sprawl. The study finds that low-density development is as much as twice as expensive to support as high-density development, but it has been extensively criticized for, among other things, its failure to control for other relevant factors (Altshuler and Goméz-Ibáñez 1993) . Since then, refinements on the approach have mainly continued to find that low-density land use patterns are more expensive to support, but, unfortunately, most produce few generalizable conclusions due to their site-specific focus (see Frank 1989 and Burchell 1998 for reviews and Spier and Stephenson 2002 for an example). Meanwhile, public finance oriented work by Ladd and Yinger (1991) and Ladd (1992 Ladd ( , 1994 ) finds a u-shaped relationship between the number of people per square mile of county land area and per capita spending and, so, concludes that high-density areas are ultimately more, not less, expensive to support. Last, a study of land use patterns by Carruthers and Úlfarsson (2003) finds evidence that density does lower the cost of many services; the analysis measures density via developed land area, not county land area, but it is primarily a hypothesis testing exercise, so it stops short of attempting to measure the magnitude of the relationship between sprawl and public finance in a detailed way.
€
Research on the second dimension of sprawl, the spatial extent of developed land, emanates from Lösch-style (1954) locational analysis, where the problem is to optimize on the placement of centralized facilities (see Thisse and Zoller 1983) . This has traditionally been done on the basis of accessibility and coverage but other criteria, such as equity-which is accepted by many planners as a normative benchmark of urban form (Lynch 1981 )-can also be used (Mulligan 1991 (Mulligan , 2000 Farhan and Murray 2006) . In the present context, the spatial extent of developed land matters in terms of the number and size of facilities needed to serve a given population, plus in terms of the span of the infrastructure needed to support day-to-day activities and deliver services effectively. But, even though capital improvements planning is central to land use planning (Kaiser et al. 1995) , very little work has been done to identify how the spatial extent of developed land affects public finance; instead, this dimension of sprawl is usually just treated as implicit in density. A notable exception is a study by Hopkins et al. (2004) , which finds that carefully planned development can save revenue by relying on fewer and larger facilities.
The analysis by Carruthers and Úlfarsson (2003) also finds evidence that the spatial extent of developed land increases the cost of many public services but, as with density, no attempt is made to measure the size of the influence. In sum, even though locational analysis has long been used for facilities planning, relatively little is known about how the horizontal dimension of sprawl affects public finance.
Empirical Analysis
Modeling Framework
The point of departure for the empirical analysis is a so-called "spillover model" that results from strategic interaction among local governments (Brueckner 1998 (Brueckner , 2003 :
where per capita expenditure on public services in jurisdiction i, e i , depends on per capita expenditure on public services in surrounding jurisdictions j , e j , plus a vector of local characteristics, X i . R is described as a "reaction function," (Brueckner 2003 , page 177) because it results from jurisdiction i's calculated response to the spending of proximate jurisdictions.
Although spillovers can take different forms-for example, due to competition, emulation, and/or other kinds of government behavior-they are treated as a composite here because the focus is squarely on sprawl as a cost factor.
The relationship in equation (1) can be estimated with a spatial lag model (Anselin 1988 (Anselin , 2002 , expressed as: because it plays out across geographic space, public finance is subject to systematic spatial dependence.
The present analysis applies the modeling framework just described to examine per capita expenditure on public services, e, by local governments (including state and federal government transfers) at the regional level by using counties as the spatial units, i and j. This adaptation, which is similar to work done by Robinson (1992, 1993) , means that each observation generally contains multiple jurisdictions-including the county itself, plus municipalities, school districts, special districts, and, potentially, others-so the spillovers that the analysis captures are really the net of interaction among many entities at multiple tiers of government. It is for this reason that the effect is simply labeled a "composite spillover" and no attempt is made to understand the specific nature of the mechanism/s involved. 7 Even so, the strategic interaction framework is adopted for both theoretical and empirical reasons: First, to recognize the presence of an underlying behavioral model of public finance and second, to avoid an econometric misspecification that does not account for the spatial dependence introduced by various forms of strategic interaction.
Moving on, in addition to the spatially lagged dependent variable, equations (1) and (2) contain a vector, X i , representing relevant explanatory variables. The specification of the empirical model originates from early work done by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and the choice of specific variables is based directly on more recent work done by Ladd and Yinger (1991) , Ladd (1992 Ladd ( , 1994 , Carruthers and Úlfarsson (2003) , Solé-Ollé (2005) , and Solé-Ollé and Bosch (2005) . Although the specification does not match any of these identically-due to data availability, the different purposes of the analyses, and so on-care was taken to ensure it corresponds to the extent possible. (Glickfield and Levine 1992) .
Data and Econometric Specification
The clustered by both state and region, including, in the latter case, in a way that spills across state lines. The first pattern suggests that fixed effects should be added to an empirical specification of equation (2) in order to account for unobserved factors common to all counties located within the same state; it also suggests that the model should be estimated in a manner that deals with heteroskedasticity introduced by variation in unobservable characteristics relevant to that level.
Even more important, the second pattern reinforces the choice of modeling frameworks because spatial relationships that are not confined by state boundaries are clearly visible, even to the naked eye. As already mentioned, failing to account for this pattern of spatial dependence would produce a misspecified model and, ultimately, biased and inefficient estimates of Γ (Anselin 1992 ).
The modeling framework described in the preceding section is applied identically (for the sake of comparability) to one aggregate and nine disaggregate measures of public spending: Total direct expenditure, education, fire protection, housing and community development, libraries, € € € parks and recreation, police protection, roadways, sewerage, and solid waste management. A description of each measure of spending, taken from the survey form that the Census of Governments uses to collect the data, is provided in Table 2 . Here, all notation is the same as above, except that e indicates that per capita public expenditure * is in natural log form (Carruthers and Úlfarsson 2003) and so is its spatial lag, We ; s denotes each of the ten measures of public spending; Φ represents a vector of state fixed effects, including one for Washington, DC; and W is a 3,075 × 3,075 (n × n) row-standardized weights matrix that describes the spatial connectivity of the data set. The weights matrix was created using the center of each county's population-that is, a point, calculated using census tract-level data, identifying where people are concentrated rather than the geographic center-to identify neighbors. In the scheme, each county i is related to all counties j having population centers located within 50 miles of its own population center or, in the 65 cases where the distance is greater than 50 miles, to a single nearest neighbor. The connectivity of the resulting spatial weights matrix is illustrated in Figure 6 .
Last, the behavioral underpinning of the model says that proximate counties are influenced by each other, so We is endogenous to e, and equation (3) cannot be properly estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). That is, because per capita spending in county i depends on per capita spending in counties j and the other way around, there is a "chicken-oregg" problem that must be resolved by choosing an appropriate estimator. The approach used here is a spatial two-stage least squares (S2SLS) strategy developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) (Das et al. 2003) .
Recent examples of other work in the area of public finance that use this estimator as opposed to, or along with, an ML estimator include Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001), Revelli (2002 Revelli ( , 2003 , Baicker (2005) , and Solé-Ollé (2006). 
Estimation Results
The S2SLS estimation results for the various structural models are shown in Tables 4 -7 corresponding t-statistics, the tables list elasticities, η k , which were calculated for each of the continuous explanatory variables at the mean values of the regressors using the appropriate set of counties-that is, the calculations were made after accounting for dropped observations, so they reflect only those that were actually included in the individual models. The elasticities are considered in detail in the next section, which applies the findings of the empirical analysis to address each of the four policy questions that were posed in the introduction. For now, working 9 In practice, all of the spatial variables, We s and WX were calculated in GeoDa, a program designed for spatial analysis and computation (Anselin 2003; Anselin et al. 2006) , then imported into EViews, an econometrics program, with the rest of the data, e s and X, where the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions were run using panel settings to identify the states as cross-sections for fixed effects and as clusters for White-adjusted standard errors.
down though the list of explanatory variables, the following paragraphs summarize the estimation results in a general way.
To begin with, the spatially lagged dependent variables, We s , register positive and highly significant spillover effects in all of the equations. The mediating influence of the strategic interaction is illustrated in Table 4 , which includes OLS estimates alongside the S2SLS estimates.
Adding the spatial lag to the model and re-estimating it with the appropriate technique lowers the value of most of the parameter estimates, sometimes by a wide margin. For example, compared to the OLS estimates, the S2SLS estimates of the parameters on the two variables measuring sprawl, the density of developed land and the percentage of county land area that is developed, are 15.97% and 5.15% smaller, respectively; on average, the absolute value of the difference in the parameters from the first regression to the second is 10.17%. Because the dependent variables and their spatial lags are both in log form, the parameters on the spatial lags are interpreted as elasticities, so a 1% change, whether positive or negative, in per capita total direct spending in the surrounding region produces a localized ~0.20% change in total direct spending. Of course, the size of this effect varies substantially among the nine disaggregate measures of spending: The elasticity on the spatial lag of per capita spending on police protection (0.3767) is by far the largest and the elasticity on the spatial lag of per capita spending on education (0.1119) is the smallest. Taken as a group, these estimates show that local governments engage in exactly the kind of strategic interaction that motivates the modeling framework, and, just as importantly, that the resulting pattern of spatial dependence in public finance persists even after accounting for the kind of state-level correlation absorbed by the fixed effects.
Next, in the Built Environment category, the parameter on the density of developed land, the first measure of sprawl, carries a negative sign and is statistically significant in the total direct, education, parks and recreation, police protection, and roadways models; it is negative and insignificant in all other cases, except for housing and community development where it is positive and highly significant. The parameter on the second measure of sprawl, the percentage of county land area that is developed (holding county land area constant), is positive and statistically significant in all cases except for housing and community development and solid waste management. Median housing value, a demand factor, and the percentage of housing built before 1940, an additional cost factor, also have a positive influence in most of the equations. The only equation where median housing value negatively influences spending is for housing and community development, a service that is mainly channeled to blighted areas in need of redevelopment and/or where people receive rental subsidies, such as assistance under the Section 8 voucher program (Pendall 2000) . Meanwhile, aged development requires higher levels of spending for rehabilitation and maintenance of physical infrastructure like roadways and sewerage. As explained further below, the results from the two measures of sprawl yield clear evidence that smart growth, with its anti-sprawl policies, matters to public finance: The estimates consistently indicate that high-density, compact development costs less to support than lowdensity, spatially extensive development. More broadly, these findings represent a large step forward in urban and regional policy evaluation, because they are the most detailed measurements to date of the relationship between the built environment and public finance.
The remaining categories of control variables also reveal important relationships. First, in the Political Structure category, the two fragmentation variables, per capita municipalities and per capita special districts, supply little evidence that intergovernmental competition lowers the cost of public services. In fact, municipal fragmentation apparently increases per capita spending on education and roadways, possibly by exacerbating various locational inefficiencies; likewise, special districts, which have rapidly reshaped public finance over the past several decades (Foster 1997 ), appear to have a positive, rather than negative, influence. Second, in the Growth and Demographics category, the parameter on the rate of population change is almost always highly significant and negative; the parameter on per capita income is positive whenever significant; the parameter on the percentage of the population that is white is mostly significant, but its sign differs from equation-to-equation; the parameter on the percentage of the population that is less than five years old is mostly insignificant but is very large and positive in the education equation;
and the average household size is negative and statistically significant in all but a few of the models. Overall, this category of explanatory variables indicates that rapid population growth negatively influences existing residents' share of spending and that, other things being equal, per capita spending is greater in regions with a high per capita income (at least for select services, like libraries and parks and recreation), a greater proportion of minorities, and younger, smaller families. Third, members of the Sources of Revenue category, which, with the exception of the percentage of tax revenue that comes from property taxes, nearly always have a positive influence when significant, provide insight how local governments finance their spending. In two cases, fire protection and parks and recreation, per capita state revenue carries the perverse (negative) sign and is statistically significant, but these may be spurious correlations-or, it may be that certain state funding comes with strings attached that end up causing communities to divert spending away from these particular services. The tax price is interesting because it positively influences per capita spending on education; although this variable, as a demand factor, is expected to carry a negative sign, the positive sign in this case makes at least tentative sense given the interdependency between school quality and property values (Fischel 2001) . Fourth, in the County Size and Primacy category, the parameters on the three cost factors, county land area, the ratio of employment to population, and the average government wage, are always positive when significant and the metropolitan and micropolitan dummy variables show how the different types of spending vary up and down the regional hierarchy. Finally, note that, in order to conserve space, all of the state fixed effects have been suppressed from the tables.
Policy Evaluation
The introduction to this paper posed four questions about the reasoning behind the kind of fiscally motivated, anti-sprawl policy frameworks that have swept the United States over the past several decades: Do low-density, spatially extensive land use patterns cost more to support? If so, how large of an influence does sprawl actually have? How does the influence differ among types of spending? And, how does it compare to the influence of other relevant factors? The answers to these questions, which are based on the findings of the empirical analysis, yield clear evidence that smart growth matters to public finance.
Do Low-density, Spatially Extensive Land Use Patterns Cost More to Support?
The estimation results listed in Tables 4 -7 show that the density of developed land has a negative effect on five key measures of local government spending: Total direct, education, parks and recreation, police protection, and roadways. The four disaggregate measures are particularly important because, going in order, they are the first, second, sixth, and third largest of the nine types of spending considered here: On average, they account for 44.95%, 6.33%, 1.45%, and 3.76% of total direct spending. Further, if one-tailed hypothesis tests had been assumed-on the grounds that the direction of influence was anticipated in advance-density would have registered a negative effect on fire protection, libraries, and sewerage, too. Density carries the expected negative sign in the model for spending on solid waste management but it does not come close to being statistically significant, even assuming a more liberal one-tailed hypothesis test. The remaining case, housing and community development, which is positively influenced by density, is sensible, because of the higher cost of land acquisition and construction, among other things, in built-up areas. Next, the spatial extent of developed land, measured as the percentage of county land area that is developed while holding county land area constant, has a positive influence in all but two instances, where it does not approach statistical significance. In sum, the results for these two variables show that, other things being equal, the kind of low-density, spatially extensive development patterns that characterize sprawl cost more to support than the high-density, compact development patterns that the smart growth movement advocates.
How Large of an Influence Does Sprawl Actually Have?
The magnitude of sprawl's overall influence on public finance in the United States is estimated by applying the elasticities for density (η = -0.0136) and percent developed (η = 0.0246) from the total direct expenditure model to two alternative land use scenarios: The first assumes that all counties nationwide developed in a way that was 25% more compact (more dense and less expansively developed) than they are and the second assumes that all counties in the country developed in a way that was 50% more compact. 10 The dollar values associated with these changes are calculated by obtaining the product of: (1) the relevant elasticity, (2) the relevant percent difference, (3) per capita total direct spending during the 2002 fiscal year, and (4) county population. The first scenario suggests that, if the nation's land use patterns had somehow evolved differently, and development everywhere was 25% more dense, public services would cost, in net, $3.63 billion less annually; if it were that much less expansive, public services would cost $6.56 billion less annually. The second scenario suggests that, if development everywhere was 50% more dense, public services would cost $7.25 billion less annually; if it were that much less expansive, public services would cost $13.12 billion less annually. Capitalized at 5%-moreor-less the current long-term interest rate that most local governments are subject to-as an approximation of opportunity costs, the annual values from the two scenarios translate into $72.75 billion and $131.20 billion (25%) and $145.07 billion and $262.40 billion (50%).
Clearly, these numbers are artificial in that they assume a uniformly different outcome of growth throughout the entire country but they nonetheless give a general sense of just how large of an influence sprawl may have had on public finance. That said, the hypothetical savings, especially vis-à-vis the long-term (capitalized) opportunity costs, are nontrivial enough that some places may wish to identify how to better connect financial planning to land use planning: With a population of 88,000 and per capita total direct expenditures of about $3,200, the average county would annually save $1.18 million ($2.36 million) if it were 25% (50%) more dense and $2.13 million ($4.27 million) if it were that much less developed. Like before, capitalizing these values shows that the opportunity costs are large: $23.59 million ($47.18 million) and $42.67 million ($85.33 million) if development was 25% (50%) more compact. In an era of far reaching budget cuts and increased fiscal conservatism among the general public, these figures seem big enough to merit consideration. 10 The average density of all counties in the country is 2.49 people plus jobs per acre of developed land, so, on average, these scenarios imply densities of 3.11 and 3.73 people plus jobs per acre of developed land, respectively; the average proportion of county land area that is developed 8% so, on average, these scenarios imply 6% and 4%, respectively.
How Does the Influence Differ Among Types of Spending?
The elasticities reported for the individual expenditures in Tables 5 -7 then on roadways (η = 0.0321); and then on education (η = 0.0128). In more qualitative terms, this dimension of sprawl has the largest influence on services having centralized facilities that may have to be replicated when they otherwise would not; a more moderate influence on linear infrastructure systems that connect to centralized facilities; and the smallest influence on facilities/services that receive heavy day-to-day use. As a set, the elasticities illustrate that there is wide variation in how public finance is affected by the underlying pattern of land use.
How Does the Influence of Sprawl Compare to the Influence of Other Relevant Factors?
Direct comparison of the various elasticities needs to be tempered by a recognition that they The larger an elasticity, the more responsive spending is to changes in the corresponding variable, so, at first glance, the figures reported in Table 4 by public policy-most demographic conditions, such as the number of young children, are not among them-the influence of sprawl is large. In particular, the elasticities on the density and spatial extent of developed land are on the level with those for median housing value (η = 0.0843), the percentage of housing built prior to 1940 (η = 0.0337), the rate of population change (η = -0.0251), and most sources of revenue. And, here again, the two measures of sprawl deviate much further from their mean than most of these, which are generally more uniform across the country. So, to answer the question in brief: Compared to other relevant factors, the influence of sprawl is sizable.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper began by outlining the connections between smart growth and public finance, then opened an investigation into them by: (1) reviewing previous research pertaining to the topic; (2) estimating a series of spatial econometric models for measuring how the built environment and other relevant cost and demand factors influence local service expenditures; and (3) evaluating the nature and extent of the relationship. The results of the analysis link one of the main ideas behind smart growth-namely, that low-density, spatially extensive development patterns are more expensive to support-directly to public finance. While there is a lot of variation in how the density and the spatial extent of development influence different types of services, other things being equal, sprawl, as a cost factor, nearly always raises per capita spending, and the effects translate into large dollar values when summed across the entire country. They are also quite large on a case-by-case basis when capitalized at a conventional long-term lending rate as approximations of opportunity costs. These findings strongly suggest that the reasoning behind fiscally motivated, anti-sprawl smart growth policy frameworks is sound. Several conclusions and directions for future research follow.
Foremost, the results of the analysis link one of the main ideas behind smart growth to public finance via local government spending, an intermediate output, but they do not necessarily extend to the final outputs that residents eventually enjoy. Going forward, a key question that must be addressed is: Do high-density, compact development patterns make any difference for service quality, or do they just make services less expensive to provide? This question is critical for the smart growth movement because it cuts to the core of its holistic, quality-of-life orientation. It is important to remember, for example, that the point of departure for much of the previous research on how development patterns affect public finance was concern for the poor fiscal health and corresponding depravity that the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s visited upon many built-up areas of the United States (Ladd and Yinger 1991) . Public finance in-and-of itself is closely related to quality-of-life Tracy 1989, 1991) but, ultimately, it is the low crime rates, good schools, and other tangible outcomes of local government spending that influence where people choose to live (see, for example, Bayoh et al. 2006) . For this reason, to the extent that it can ensure that public services are delivered both cost effectively and at a high level of quality, smart growth stands to play a major part in determining places' comparative advantage.
In addition, given its holistic orientation, further evaluations of smart growth should examine its ability to actually achieve more desirable living conditions. The land use reform movement that produced most of the contemporary anti-sprawl policy frameworks was led, at first, by an environmental awakening (Popper 1981) and, later, by critical thought regarding the extent to which development patterns actually serve the best interests of their inhabitants (Calthorpe 1993; Duany et al. 2000) . Recent work by Song and Knaap (2003, 2004) shows that people place a premium on housing located in "neo-traditional," or "new urbanist,"
developments, suggesting that a distinct market for smart growth may have emerged. Whether this is simply a product of aesthetics or of a more complex blend of architectural, environmental, fiscal, and other factors remains an open question, though. The need to resolve the issue is brought into stark relief by the fact that, even though urban and regional policymakers are responsible for shaping settlement patterns into what they somehow "ought to be," they have so far advanced few defensible criteria for favoring one outcome over another (Talen and Ellis 2002 ). Lynch's (1981) classic work, Good City Form, delineates a set of very specific normative criteria-vitality, sense, fit, access, control, efficiency, and justice-for evaluating alternative modes of land use, but policymakers have too often failed to rigorously connect smart growth, or any of its goals, to a framework of this sort. The results presented here indicate that sprawl is not efficient from the standpoint of public finance but, with further research, other criteria, such as equity and justice, may turn out to be important as well. Lynch's framework holds great promise for helping to advance the cause of smart growth because it provides a source of structure for analyzing land use policies in terms of the quality-of-life benefits they are meant to produce.
Each of these conclusions is highly general because the analysis presented in this paper focuses on aggregate, county-level patterns of public spending. It is not clear that the findings would apply in exactly the same way on a community-by-community basis, so readers should be cautious about interpreting the results in that way. That is, the analysis observes the relationship between sprawl and public finance at the county level, not at the municipal or neighborhood Similarly, the overall trajectory of growth through time may also make a difference, especially in instances where large areas are often committed to development via comprehensive planning, zoning, and other forms of land use planning before they are actually filled in (Carruthers and Mulligan 2007) . In future research, these and other important jurisdiction-level issues deserve careful thought and analysis.
Finally, as an extension of this need for more locally oriented work, the nature of the strategic interaction registered by the empirical models should be investigated further.
Specifically, a procedural goal of many smart growth programs is to promote cooperation among local governments as a means of meeting broader societal objectives (Carruthers 2002) .
Theoretical research (Haughwout 1997 (Haughwout , 1999 and applied policy analysis (Orfield 1997 (Orfield , 2002 alike show that, in the case of public finance, there is a great deal of fiscal interdependency within regions and that cooperation, rather than competition, can produce net benefits for all of those involved. Determining how the spillovers captured by the kind of spatial reaction functions estimated here reconcile with this "regionalist" view would also require with the use of disaggregate, jurisdiction-level data, plus, at the very least, discriminating among different forms of interaction in order to more precisely represent the motivations and behavior of individual governments. Although a project like this would be highly involved, particularly if it were done for the entire country, taking the step would add great depth to the study of smart growth by better integrating it with theory of local government behavior. In the end, such an approach is necessary in order to develop a full understanding of the complex ways in which smart growth matters to public finance; in the meantime, this paper has taken key steps in that direction. 0.61 Notes: All models were estimated using White-adjusted standard errors clustered by state; all state fixed effects have been suppressed to conserve space; *** denotes two-tailed hypothesis test significant at p < 0.01; ** denotes two-tailed hypothesis test significant at p < 0.05; * denotes two-tailed hypothesis test significant at p < 0.10; n/s denotes two-tailed hypothesis test not significant. 0.46 0.60 Notes: All models were estimated using White-adjusted standard errors clustered by state; all state fixed effects have been suppressed to conserve space; *** denotes two-tailed hypothesis test significant at p < 0.01; ** denotes two-tailed hypothesis test significant at p < 0.05; * denotes two-tailed hypothesis test significant at p < 0.10; n/s denotes two-tailed hypothesis test not significant. 0.36 Notes: All models were estimated using White-adjusted standard errors clustered by state; all state fixed effects have been suppressed to conserve space; *** denotes two-tailed hypothesis test significant at p < 0.01; ** denotes two-tailed hypothesis test significant at p < 0.05; * denotes two-tailed hypothesis test significant at p < 0.10; n/s denotes two-tailed hypothesis test not significant. , 1992 -1997 
